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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the psychological concept of anxiety into conventional principal-
agent theory. In doing so, we are motivated by experimental and econometric evidence
which suggests that incentives and monitoring can be counterproductive. A distinctive
feature of the anxiety construct, which has both empirical and theoretical support, is that
anxiety can improve or reduce performance, depending on its eﬀect on eﬀort. An increase in
incentives or reduction in monitoring which increases anxiety can therefore be motivational
or demotivational. An optimizing principal, however, will never oﬀer counterproductive
incentives in equilibrium, which reconciles the experimental evidence on the existence
of counterproductive incentives with econometric work indicating that incentives can be
motivational in practice. Since anxiety can be motivational, the principal might not want
to eliminate it, and may choose incomplete monitoring even when monitoring is costless.
Moreover, the principal may even want to introduce extraneous noise in order to generate
anxiety. Finally, since monitoring can be directly motivational, incentives and monitoring
can be substitutes or complements in our theory.Most of economics can be summarized in four words: “People respond to incen-
tives.” The rest is commentary.
Landsburg (1993, p. 3)
Ultimately, it may be that psychologists, behaviorists, human resource consul-
tants, and personnel executives understand something about human behavior and
motivation that is not yet captured in our economic models.
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988, p. 615)
1. Introduction
Do people really respond to incentives? Standard economic theory assumes so, but until
recently this question has received relatively little attention in the economic literature. At
the empirical level, Lazear (2000) reports that productivity increased by about 44% when
the Safelite Glass Corporation switched from hourly wages to piece rates:
Some conclusions are unambiguous. Workers respond to prices just as economic
theory predicts. Claims by sociologists and others that monetizing incentives may
actually reduce output are unambiguously refuted by the data.
Lazear (2000, p. 1347).
As Lazear notes, however, some social scientists have questioned the eﬀectiveness of mone-
tary incentives, and the non-economic literature contains a substantial body of experimen-
tal evidence which suggests that contingent rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation
and even reduce performance. Moreover, recent experimental work by economists support
these ﬁndings; see Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Gneezy (2003), and the survey by Frey
and Jegen (2001). If incentives can have “hidden costs” or even be counterproductive,
this may help explain why extensive piece rate systems like the well-known case of Lincoln
Electric1 seem to be the exception rather than the norm, as well as Jensen and Murphy’s
(1990) ﬁnding that the pay-performance relationship for CEOs seems very weak, albeit
positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
A nascent but growing theoretical literature attempts to explain how incentives can be
demotivational. Gibbs (1991) informally argues that a contingent reward can signal to the
1 “The Lincoln Electric Company,” Case 376-028, Harvard Business School.
1agent that the probability of promotion is high, dulling promotion incentives. Motivation
crowding theory, surveyed in Frey and Jegen (2001), posits that extrinsic incentives can
“crowd out” intrinsic motivation. B´ enabou and Tirole (2003), which can be viewed as
formalizing certain aspects of motivation crowding theory, demonstrate that incentives
can have hidden costs by signaling that a task is diﬃcult or distasteful, or the agent’s
skill is low. Although their model helps explain the prevalence of low-powered incentive
systems, it seems unable to explain the aforementioned experimental evidence, since the
agent’s optimal eﬀort is still nondecreasing in incentives. The formal literature on trust,
including Casadesus-Masanell (2004), shows that psychological contracts can outperform
extrinsic incentive contracts. In particular, switching from the former to the latter can
reduce performance, although switching from a low-powered incentive contract to a high-
powered one always increases eﬀort and performance.
Standard economic theory also conﬂicts with some empirical evidence on the eﬀects of
monitoring. In eﬃciency wage theory, an increase in monitoring is modeled as an increase
in the probability of detecting shirking, and incentives and monitoring are substitutes.
In principal-agent theory, monitoring is a costly technology which reduces the noise asso-
ciated with the principal’s performance measure. In the standard linear principal-agent
model (SLM),2 monitoring has no direct eﬀect on eﬀort. Instead, it reduces the agent’s
risk premium, permitting stronger incentives, which in turn induce greater eﬀort. Incen-
tives and monitoring are therefore complements. In both classes of models, monitoring is
associated with greater eﬀort and expected performance. However, econometric work by
Barkema (1995) [see also the evidence cited in Frey (1993)] suggests that monitoring can
be counterproductive when the principal-agent relationship is close. Their explanation is
that monitoring can signal distrust and thereby reduce intrinsic motivation, in accordance
with motivation crowding theory.
In this paper, we address the growing experimental and econometric evidence on
the demotivational eﬀects of incentives and monitoring by introducing the psychological
construct of anxiety into conventional principal-agent theory. Speciﬁcally, we consider a
version of the SLM where we replace the agent’s usual risk premium with a formalization
2 E.g., see Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Ch. 7) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Ch. 4).
2of anxiety based on Caplin and Leahy’s (2001) psychological expected utility theory and the
more structured anxiety concept in Rauh and Seccia (2006). In the next section, we provide
a brief overview of the economic and psychological literatures on anxiety and show that
anxiety and the risk premium are substantively similar conceptualizations of subjective
evaluation of uncertainty.
A distinctive feature of the anxiety construct, which has both empirical and theoretical
support, is that anxiety can either improve or reduce performance, depending on its eﬀect
on eﬀort. The idea that anxiety can induce greater eﬀort and expected performance is
formalized in Rauh and Seccia (2006), where an increase in anxiety induces the agent to
expend more eﬀort in an attempt to obtain more information. It is also a central element
in the processing eﬃciency theory from cognitive psychology, which posits that anxiety can
serve a positive motivational function. The inverted-U hypothesis, an important benchmark
in the psychology literature, is even more speciﬁc: anxiety improves performance when
anxiety is low, but reduces it when anxiety is high. This is supported by many empirical
studies, although the evidence is mixed.
In our theory, incentives directly encourage greater eﬀort, but also generate anxiety by
increasing the variance of income. This mirrors the usual trade-oﬀ between incentives and
eﬃcient risk-sharing. The diﬀerence is that anxiety can be motivational or demotivational,
so incentives can have hidden rewards or hidden costs, respectively. When anxiety is
suﬃciently debilitating, eﬀort and expected performance actually decline. However, a
well-informed optimizing principal will never oﬀer such counterproductive incentives in
equilibrium, which reconciles the experimental evidence on the existence of demotivational
incentives with econometric work such as Lazear (2000), who found a strong positive
eﬀect. In experiments, incentives are determined by an experimenter for scientiﬁc purposes,
whereas real-world data may be generated in part by principals who are interested in proﬁt-
maximization.
Likewise, monitoring reduces anxiety by lowering the variance of the productivity
shock and can therefore be motivational or demotivational. Unlike incentives, the prin-
cipal may choose a demotivational level of monitoring in equilibrium, in order to reduce
the agent’s anxiety to satisfy the participation constraint. Since anxiety can be motiva-
3tional, the principal might not want to eliminate it, and may choose incomplete monitoring
(non-zero variance for the productivity shock) even when monitoring is costless. Indeed,
the principal may want to introduce extraneous noise in order to generate anxiety for
motivational purposes, which violates the well-known informativeness principle due to
Holmstr¨ om (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). The fact that monitoring can be di-
rectly motivational in our model suggests that incentives and monitoring can be substitutes
or complements, which we conﬁrm through simulations. This blurs the usual dichotomy
between eﬃciency wage and principal-agent models, where incentives and monitoring are
substitutes and complements, respectively. Moreover, simulations reveal that the agent’s
optimal eﬀort and expected performance may conform to the inverted-U hypothesis.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy discuss
the anxiety literature in economics and psychology. In sections 3 and 4, we develop the
general model and present our comparative statics results. Unless otherwise stated, all
proofs are in the appendix. Section 5 presents simulations showing that incentives and
monitoring can be complements or substitutes. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Anxiety Literature in Economics and Psychology3
In economics, agents’ subjective evaluation of uncertainty is typically formalized by the
usual concepts of risk aversion and risk premium. In the univariate case, the former can
be measured by the curvature of the utility function, while the latter is deﬁned as the
maximum amount of money the agent would pay to have a certain income ¯ I instead of a
random income with mean ¯ I. In the SLM, where compensation is linear in output, utility
is exponential, and the productivity shock is normally distributed, the risk premium is
given by
RP(r,V ) = (1/2)rV, (1)
where r is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion (CARA) and V is the variance of income.
Note that the risk premium is increasing in r and V . Under much more general conditions,
3 This section is strongly tailored for the purposes of this paper. For more extensive surveys, see Caplin
and Leahy (2001), Woodman and Hardy (2001), and Rauh and Seccia (2006).
4the risk premium can be approximated by
RP(r,V ) = (1/2)r(¯ I)V, (2)
where the CARA depends on expected income.4
In contrast, the anxiety concept is a much broader and richer approach to the subjec-
tive evaluation of uncertainty. In this paper, we replace the risk premium in the agent’s
objective function with a formalization of anxiety A(e,V ) which is increasing in V like
the risk premium and decreasing in the agent’s eﬀort e. This will have unique properties
which will generate results inconsistent with the SLM, but consistent with the empirical
evidence discussed in the introduction.
Deﬁnition of Anxiety
The concepts and terminology in anxiety research have not been standardized, but the
following is a representative deﬁnition:
Anxiety is generally accepted as being an unpleasant emotion... Researchers in
mainstream psychology have suggested that anxiety might have at least two distin-
guishable components: a mental component normally termed cognitive anxiety or
worry, and a physiological component normally termed somatic anxiety or physio-
logical arousal.
Woodman and Hardy (2001, p. 290-291) (italics in the original).
The ﬁrst component, cognitive anxiety, can be further described as follows:
Worry is a cognitive phenomenon, it is concerned with future events where there
is uncertainty about the outcome, the future being thought about is a negative one,
and this is accompanied by feelings of anxiety.
MacLeod, Williams, and Bekerian (1991, p. 478)
[as quoted in Caplin and Leahy (2001)].
As such, cognitive anxiety is substantively very similar to the economic concepts of risk
aversion and risk premium. The second component, physiological arousal can induce such
physical symptoms as an elevated heart rate and shaky hands: “indications of autonomic
arousal and unpleasant feeling states such as nervousness and tension” [Morris, Davis, and
4 See the appendix to Chapter 7 in Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
5Hutchings (1981, p. 541)]. Although physiological arousal can aﬀect motor performance,
it seems relatively unimportant in the context of this paper, which is focused on incentive
mechanisms. We henceforth focus exclusively on cognitive anxiety.
Inverted-U Hypothesis
An important benchmark is the inverted-U hypothesis or Yerkes-Dodson Law, which posits
that performance is increasing in anxiety when anxiety is low, but decreasing when anxi-
ety is high. One advantage of the anxiety concept is that there is a substantial empirical
psychology literature on the relationship between anxiety and performance (athletic perfor-
mance, information processing, reaction times, etc.) based on direct measures of anxiety,
including objective measures of physiological conditions such as heart rate and blood pres-
sure, as well as subjective self-report scales. In contrast, economists tend to study the
relationship between attitudes towards risk and behavior only indirectly, backing out val-
ues for risk premia by comparing theoretical predictions with the data. Although the
empirical psychology literature is mixed, many studies support the inverted-U hypothesis,
which is also a feature of the Rauh and Seccia (2006) formalization of anxiety under certain
parameter conﬁgurations.5 Nevertheless, it has been severely criticized by some psychol-
ogists as being overly simplistic and because it does not have any associated explanation
for the supposed relationship: it is merely a hypothesis, not a theory.
The Processing Eﬃciency Theory
The anxiety literature in psychology includes several theories about the eﬀects of anxiety
on behavior, performance, and well-being, but the most relevant for the present paper is
the processing eﬃciency theory of Eysenck and Calvo (1992), who were motivated by the
5 For a survey of the empirical psychology literature, see Zaichkowsky and Baltzell (2001). Other well-
known hypotheses are that performance is monotonically declining in anxiety or that the 3-dimensional
relationship between performance, cognitive anxiety, and physiological arousal is a standard cusp catas-
trophe; see Woodman and Hardy (2001).
6diversity of ﬁndings in the empirical psychology literature:
One is concerned with the explanation of the relationship between anxiety and
performance, taking into account not only the data regarding the negative eﬀects
of anxiety, but also trying to reconcile them with those ﬁndings indicating a lack of
eﬀect (or even a positive one).
Eysenck and Calvo (1992, p. 410).
As in most anxiety theories, the negative eﬀect of anxiety is that it induces worry:
Worrisome thoughts interfere with attention to task-relevant information, thus
reducing the cognitive resources available for task-processing activities. As a conse-
quence, performance is impaired.
(ibid, p. 410).
The novel aspect and cornerstone of the processing eﬃciency theory is that anxiety can
serve a motivational function, inducing the agent to increase eﬀort, provided that the
probability of success is perceived to be suﬃciently high.
In order to escape from the state of apprehension associated with worrisome
thoughts and to avoid the likely aversive consequences of poor performance, anxious
subjects try to cope with threat and worry allocating additional resources (i.e. eﬀort)
and/or initiating processing activities (i.e. strategies).
(ibid, p. 415).
Hence, an increase in anxiety can either improve or reduce performance, depending on
the probability of success and the agent’s eﬀort adjustment. Like most anxiety theories in
psychology, the processing eﬃciency theory is descriptive, rather than deductive.
The Economic Literature
Anxiety research in economics was pioneered by Loewenstein (1987) and Caplin and Leahy
(2001). We now sketch the latter, since it turns out that the agent’s decision problem in
our model is a special case.
Caplin and Leahy (2001) consider a general two-period decision problem under un-
certainty. The novel element in their psychological expected utility theory (PEUT) is an
exogenous map φ(z1,l2) which assigns a psychological state to the ﬁrst period outcome z1
and lottery l2 over second period outcomes z2. The agent’s overall utility function is
u1[φ(z1,l2)] + El2[u2(z2)], (3)
7where u1 and u2 are the ﬁrst and second period utility functions and El2 denotes the
expectation with respect to the lottery l2. Note that u1 is deﬁned over psychological
states. Given the ﬁrst period state s1 and ﬁrst period action α1, the ﬁrst period outcome
is η(s1,α1). The second period lottery λ(α1,π2|s1) is determined by α1, the agent’s second
period policy function π2, and s1. We obtain the agent’s objective function by substituting
these terms into (3)
u1[φ(η(s1,α1),λ(α1,π2|s1))] + Eλ(α1,π2|s1)[u2(z2)]. (4)
Although the PEUT is a powerful framework for modeling situations involving uncertainty,
which Caplin and Leahy illustrate with a natural application to the equity premium puzzle,
anxiety remains a “black box” in their theory, since φ is completely general, with no
structure apart from continuity.
To put more structure on A(e,V ), we appeal to Rauh and Seccia (2006),6 which
develops a formalization of anxiety consistent with expected utility maximization. In that
paper, we consider a two-period decision problem where performance πt = θet+t in period
t depends on the agent’s skill θ, eﬀort et, and productivity shock t. The agent is uncertain
about θ, and makes inferences about it by observing her own ﬁrst period performance π1.
Hence, ﬁrst period eﬀort not only increases expected ﬁrst period performance, it also aﬀects
the amount of information in the second period via the signal π1. Anxiety is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between expected utility with zero uncertainty and expected utility evaluated at
optimal eﬀort. It is therefore the opposite of the value of information; i.e., the disutility of
uncertainty. The resulting formalization of anxiety is a function A(e,R,a) of the agent’s
eﬀort e, a parameter R measuring the volatility of θ, and another parameter a measuring
the volatility of .
We show that when the distribution of  satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty, anxiety is decreasing in e, since an increase in eﬀort is informative, and increasing in
a, since an increase in noise reduces the informativeness of the signal. Furthermore, opti-
mal eﬀort and expected performance conform to the inverted-U hypothesis under certain
parameter conﬁgurations. In particular, anxiety can serve a motivational function as in the
6 The paper can be downloaded from http://home.insightbb.com/∼mtrauh/index.html.
8processing eﬃciency theory: increases in anxiety can induce greater eﬀort and expected
performance. Based on these results, in this paper we assume A(e,V ) is decreasing in e
and increasing in V . In the next section, we show that the approximation in (2) also has
these properties.
3. The General Model
We consider a version of the SLM with particular reference to Milgrom and Roberts (1992,
Ch. 7). We assume a linear compensation rule I = α+βq, where I is income, α is a lump-
sum payment, β is the incentive parameter, and q is output. The latter is determined by
q = e + , where e is the agent’s eﬀort and  is a productivity shock with mean 0 and
variance V. The variance of income is given by V = β2V.
In the SLM, the agent’s certainty equivalent is given by
CEA = α + βe − C(e) − RP(r,V ), (5)
where C is the disutility of eﬀort expressed in monetary terms and RP was deﬁned in (1).
In this paper, the agent’s expected utility is given by
U = α + βe − C(e) − A(e,V ), (6)
where A is anxiety. Note that anxiety is an “unpleasant emotion” (recall the inset quotation
in the previous section) in the sense that increased anxiety reduces expected utility. It is
also important to note that the agent has no intrinsic motivation in the sense that β = 0
induces zero eﬀort.
PEUT Foundations
The Caplin-Leahy PEUT can be used to justify (6) as follows. We consider the model as
a game with 3 periods: 0, 1, 2. In period 0, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
(α,β,V ) to the agent, which the latter can accept or reject. If she rejects, she gets ¯ u. If she
accepts, she chooses eﬀort in period 1. Since there is no ﬁrst period state, the period one
outcome is C(e), which corresponds to η(s1,α1) in the PEUT. The second period lottery
9is the wage distribution λ(e) induced by the agent’s choice of eﬀort, which corresponds to
λ(α1,π2|s1). We then deﬁne u1(x) = x and
φ[C(e),λ(e)] = −C(e) − A(e,V ), (7)
so φ transforms the economic state consisting of the disutility of eﬀort and the wage
distribution into the psychological state which is the former minus the anxiety generated
by the latter, which depends on the variance of income V . In period 2, the agent’s income
is realized. She has no decision to make and u2(x) = x, so her expected second period
utility equals her expected income α + βe. Substituting all of this into (4), we get (6).
Let emax > 0 denote maximum feasible eﬀort. Throughout the paper, partial deriva-
tives are indicated by subscripts.
Assumptions 1. (i) C and A are twice continuously diﬀerentiable. (ii) C0 > 0 and
C00 > 0 on (0,emax). (iii) C0(0) = 0 and C0(emax) = ∞. (iv) Ae < 0, Aee > 0, and AV > 0
on [0,emax] × (0,∞). (v) For some constant k, A(e,0) = k for all e ≥ 0.
The partial Ae < 0 is the change in anxiety due to a small change in eﬀort, so we call
its absolute value the marginal ability to cope (MAC). As usual, we assume diminishing
returns to eﬀort, Aee > 0, and the rest of the assumptions on the partials of A were
discussed in the previous section; c.f. propositions 3 and 7(i) in Rauh and Seccia (2006).
If V = 0, there is no uncertainty and the constant k in (v) represents minimum or baseline
anxiety (“trait anxiety”). Given these assumptions, the sub-problem
max
0≤e≤emax
α + βe − C(e) (8)
has a unique global maximizer ˆ e(β), which satisﬁes 0 < ˆ e(β) < emax when β > 0. Clearly,
the agent will never choose an eﬀort level less than ˆ e(β), so optimal eﬀort e(β,V) ∈
[ˆ e(β),emax).
10Incentives, Monitoring, and Motivation
Recall that in principal-agent theory, monitoring is a costly technology which reduces
the noise V associated with the principal’s performance measure, q. Proposition 1 below
concerns the eﬀects of incentives and monitoring on the agent’s optimal eﬀort and expected
performance (which equals eﬀort). An increase in incentives or a reduction in monitoring
increases the variance of income, and hence increases anxiety. It follows that the net eﬀect
on eﬀort and expected performance hinges on whether the increased anxiety is motivational
or not. Clearly, this depends on AeV : the eﬀect of a change in the variance of income on
the MAC. The proof of the following is standard and omitted.
Proposition 1. (i) When β > 0 the agent’s maximization problem in (6) has a unique
positive global maximizer e(β,V) ∈ [ˆ e(β),emax). (ii) When AeV < 0, optimal eﬀort
and expected performance are increasing in V, so monitoring is demotivational. When
AeV > 0, the opposite holds. (iii) When AeV < 1/(2βV), eﬀort and expected performance










In comparison with the SLM, the risk premium in (1) does not depend on eﬀort, so
RPee = RPeV = 0. Setting Aee = AeV = 0 in (9) and (10), we recover the usual results
that eV = 0 and eβ = 1/C00 > 0, so monitoring has no direct eﬀect on eﬀort and incentives
are always motivational in the SLM.
In contrast, in our theory, monitoring has a direct impact on the agent’s eﬀort. In
particular, a reduction in monitoring increases V, the variance of income, and anxiety. If
AeV < 0, the MAC increases and the agent reacts by increasing eﬀort, which improves
expected performance. In this case, anxiety is motivational and is associated with higher
eﬀort and expected performance as in the processing eﬃciency theory and Rauh and Seccia
11(2006). The opposite scenario occurs when AeV > 0. Likewise, incentives increase the
direct reward to eﬀort but also aﬀect the MAC. If AeV is suﬃciently negative to outweigh
Aee > 0 in (10), then eβ > 1/C00, so the positive eﬀect of incentives is greater than in the
SLM. In other words, incentives have “hidden rewards” since the corresponding increase in
the MAC reinforces the direct incentive eﬀect, making incentives even more eﬀective than
in standard theory. In contrast, when AeV > 0 incentives have “hidden costs” since the
reduction in the MAC conﬂicts with the direct incentive eﬀect, so incentives are relatively
less eﬀective. The novel aspect of our theory, compared with B´ enabou and Tirole (2003)
and Casadesus-Masanell (2004), is that incentives can actually be counterproductive when
the negative eﬀect on the MAC outweighs the direct incentive eﬀect.
The Principal’s Problem
Let p > 0 be the agent’s constant marginal revenue product (MRP) and M(V) the cost
of monitoring, where −M0 > 0 and −M00 < 0. The principal’s problem is
max
e,β,V≥0
pe − α − βe − M(V) (11)
subject to the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition (which is necessary and suﬃcient by proposition
1) and the participation constraint U ≥ ¯ u. As in the SLM, the sole purpose of α is to
make the latter bind. Substituting U = ¯ u into (11),
max
e,β,V≥0
Π = pe − C(e) − A(e,β2V) − M(V) − ¯ u, (12)
which is similar to equation 7.8 in Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 226).
Although proposition 1 shows that counterproductive incentives are possible under
certain conditions, an optimizing principal will never oﬀer them in equilibrium according
to proposition 2 below. An important implication of these results is that econometric work
such as Lazear (2000) using data generated by presumably proﬁt-maximizing principals
cannot refute the experimental evidence on demotivational incentives, where incentives
are determined by the experimenter and are likely to be sub-optimal. Moreover, our
results are predicated on a fully optimizing principal who has a great deal of information
about the agent. An inexperienced or uninformed principal could oﬀer counterproductive
12incentives by mistake, which may explain why subjects acting as principals did indeed
choose demotivational incentives in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).
In contrast, demotivational monitoring can occur in equilibrium, when the marginal
cost of monitoring is small compared to the marginal beneﬁt β2AV in terms of anxiety
reduction. This is supported by Barkema’s (1995) econometric work, which suggests that
monitoring can indeed induce lower eﬀort when the principal-agent relationship is close.
Frey (1993) cites further evidence on this point. Their ﬁndings are also consistent with
our results, since a close principal-agent relationship should also imply relatively low mon-
itoring costs.
Proposition 2. (i) At an interior solution, eβ > 0 and












Comparison with the SLM






−M0 = β2AV , (17)
which we recover by setting Aee = AeV = 0. In our model, when AeV > 0 monitoring is
motivational and incentives have hidden costs, so one would expect the principal to oﬀer
fewer incentives and more monitoring relative to the SLM, which follows from (14) and
(15). When AeV is suﬃciently negative to overcome Aee > 0 in (10) and (14), monitoring is
13demotivational and incentives have hidden rewards, so the principal oﬀers more incentives
and less monitoring. Since RPV = (1/2)r, AV corresponds to the CARA in the SLM.
Hence, the usual result that higher r implies fewer incentives and greater monitoring has
a similar statement in our model in terms of AV .
Incomplete Monitoring
In the SLM, the principal always wants to reduce V subject to any costs of doing so,
because noise increases the agent’s RP, requiring additional compensation to satisfy the
participation constraint (higher α) without any oﬀ-setting beneﬁt. In particular, the prin-
cipal should set V = 0 if monitoring is costless. In contrast, in our theory anxiety can
serve a motivating function, and proposition 3 below shows that the principal may not
want to eliminate it.
Proposition 3. Assume monitoring is costless and AeV (e,0) < 0 for all e > 0. If β > 0
and
(p − β)|AeV (ˆ e(β),0)|
C00(ˆ e(β))
> AV (ˆ e(β),0) (18)
then V > 0 in equilibrium.
Indeed, when anxiety is motivational the principal may want to increase the variance
of the productivity shock, by measuring output less precisely, issuing vague instructions
to the agent, etc.
Wealth Eﬀects
Until now, we have compared our results with those of the SLM, which assumes no wealth
eﬀects. When wealth eﬀects are present, the risk premium can be approximated by (2),
where ¯ I = α + βe. In that case, the risk premium depends on eﬀort, so it is natural to
inquire whether the results in this paper carry over to standard principal-agent models
with wealth eﬀects. If we make the usual assumption that the CARA is decreasing in
expected income r0 < 0 and r00 > 0 then RPe < 0 and RPV ,RPee > 0 as in assumptions
1. However, RPeV can only be negative, so incentives are always motivational.
144. Detailed Comparative Statics
The previous section highlighted the importance of AeV , which determines whether or
not anxiety is motivational. To investigate this term more closely, and to obtain sharper
comparative statics results, in this section we assume A(e,V ) = ¯ Af(e/V ), where ¯ A > 0.7
Assumptions 2. (i) f(x) is thrice continuously diﬀerentiable on [0,∞), with f0 < 0,













f00 > 0, (19)
assumptions 1 are satisﬁed. An example satisfying assumptions 2, as well as all subsequent
assumptions, is f(x) = exp(−x).





[f0(x) + xf00(x)], (20)
where x ≡ e/β2V. Let r(x) = −f0(x)/f00(x), the inverse of the usual absolute curvature
measure. Proposition 4 identiﬁes a condition on r(x) (and hence on f) which ensures that
AeV < 0 and eV > 0 when V is low and AeV > 0 and eV < 0 when V is high, consistent
with the inverted-U hypothesis.
Proposition 4. Assume there exists ¯ x > 0 such that
sign[r(x) − x] = sign(¯ x − x); (21)
i.e., r(x) crosses the 45◦ line at a unique point (e.g., in the exponential case ¯ x = 1). Then
for any ﬁxed β > 0, there exists 0 < V −
 (β) < V +
 (β) < ∞ such that optimal eﬀort is
increasing in V on [0,V −
 (β)] and decreasing on [V +
 (β),∞).
In the previous section, we showed that incentives are counterproductive when AeV
is positive and suﬃciently large. Proposition 5 identiﬁes suﬃcient conditions on f and
7 Separable functional forms A(e,V ) = ¯ Ag(e)h(V ) are uninteresting, since AeV = ¯ Ag0(e)h0(V ) < 0.
15s(x) = −2f00(x)/f000(x) such that mid-level incentives are demotivational. It follows that an
optimizing principal will only oﬀer low-powered or high-powered incentives in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Assume there exists ˜ x > ¯ x such that
sign[s(x) − x] = sign(˜ x − x). (22)
Furthermore, assume
2x2f000 + 5xf00 + f0 = 0 (23)
at a unique point ˆ x on (0, ¯ x) [e.g., ˜ x = 2 and ˆ x = (5 −
√
17)/4 in the exponential case].
Given any ﬁxed V > 0, when ¯ A is large enough (see the proof) there exist 0 < β−(V) <
β+(V) < ∞ such that eβ < 0 on (β−(V),β+(V)).
Proposition 4 shows that optimal eﬀort is increasing in V when V is low, and decreas-
ing when V is high, but does not say what happens for medium values of V. Similarly,
proposition 5 establishes that mid-level incentives are demotivational, but does not say
what happens for low-powered and high-powered incentives. To get a more complete pic-





so emax = 1.8 In panel A of Figure 1 below, ¯ A = 10 and V = 1.
Figure 1 Goes Here
In panel A, optimal eﬀort is increasing, decreasing, then increasing again in β, clearly
illustrating the three regions in proposition 5, where incentives are demotivational in the
middle region. In panel B, ¯ A = 10 and β = 1 and the relationship between optimal
eﬀort and V is an inverted-U. Since expected performance equals eﬀort and anxiety is
8 We used the FindRoot routine in Mathematica 5 on an Apple iMac G5 to numerically solve the
ﬁrst-order condition











(e − 1)2 = 0. (25)
16increasing in V, a plot of expected performance versus anxiety would indeed conform to
the inverted-U hypothesis. In panel C, ¯ A = 10 and we plot the complete 3-dimensional
relationship.
In proposition 3, we showed that for a given β > 0, monitoring remains incomplete
(V > 0 at the optimum) as the marginal cost of monitoring goes to zero, which shows
that the principal prefers that anxiety exceed its baseline level, for motivational purposes.
In proposition 6 below, we show that given non-zero monitoring costs, the optimal V is
bounded from below as β → ∞ (implicitly assuming β ≤ p and p → ∞). This shows
that incentives and monitoring are not strongly complementary in our theory for large β,
because monitoring is eventually demotivational. In contrast, V → 0 (complete or inﬁnite
monitoring) as β → ∞ in the SLM when −M0(0) = ∞.






has a unique solution V ∞
 > 0. Then for any δ > 0, there exists ¯ β > 0 such that for all
β > ¯ β, there exists a solution V(β) to (15) such that |V(β) − V ∞
 | < δ. Furthermore,
V(β) → V ∞
 as β → ∞.
5. Simulations
In the SLM, monitoring reduces the agent’s risk premium and allows the principal to oﬀer
stronger incentives. It does not directly aﬀect the agent’s eﬀort. In contrast, in our theory
monitoring can be motivational, which suggests that incentives and monitoring may be
substitutes, especially when β is large as in proposition 6. In this section, we simulate the
model to show that incentives and monitoring can be either complements or substitutes,






¯ A(1 − e
β2V)2 0 ≤ e ≤ β2V
0 e > β2V.
(27)
17Although this speciﬁcation does not satisfy some of our previous assumptions, we do have



















Hence, AeV can be positive or negative, which is crucial for our results. Assuming C(e) =
(1/2)e2, the agent’s objective function is piecewise quadratic, and routine calculations give
the agent’s optimal eﬀort









 +2 ¯ A βV > 1.
(30)




2 ¯ Aβ2[2 ¯ A + β3V(2 − βV)]
(2 ¯ A + β4V 2
 )2 , (31)
so the relationship between optimal eﬀort and V is an inverted-U, as in the previous
example. Although the expression for ∂e/∂β is not very informative, we obtain the same
qualitative relationship as in panel A of Figure 1 when ¯ A and V are suﬃciently large.
We now turn to the principal’s problem, assuming M(V) = 1/V. We ﬁrst consider
the case βV ≤ 1 (relatively low incentives, high monitoring), where e = β. Since anxiety
is zero, the principal’s problem is




subject to βV ≤ 1. The solution to this trivial maximization problem is β = p − 1 and
V = 1/(p − 1) provided p > 1, which we henceforth assume. In this case, the principal’s
proﬁts are (1/2)(p − 1)2. If βV > 1, then substituting the relevant expressions into (12)
and simplifying, we obtain
β4V 2
 (2pβV − β2V − 2) + 2 ¯ A(2pβ2V 2
 − β4V 3
 − 2)
4 ¯ AV + 2β4V 3

. (33)
18The principal’s proﬁt is therefore
















4 ¯ AV+2β4V 3
 βV > 1.
(34)
This maximization problem cannot be solved analytically, so we used numerical methods
to investigate its solutions.9
In Figure 2, we ﬁx ¯ A = 10 and plot the maximizers β(p) and V(p) of (34) as a function
of the agent’s MRP over the range 3 ≤ p ≤ 19. (We obtained the same qualitative behavior
for other nearby values of ¯ A.)
Figure 2 Goes Here
In Panel A, incentives are increasing in the MRP as in standard theory (the relationship
is actually nonlinear), while in Panel B V(p) is U-shaped, so monitoring is increasing then
decreasing in the MRP.
For illustrative purposes, we discuss these results in the context of management hi-
erarchies. Assuming more senior managers have higher MRPs, the pattern in Figure 2 is
that junior managers receive weak incentives and are monitored very little. At that level,
incentives and monitoring are complements, so as they move up the hierarchy they re-
ceive stronger incentives and are subjected to greater monitoring. At some point, however,
incentives and monitoring become substitutes, so more senior positions (e.g., CEOs) are as-
sociated with greater incentives, but less monitoring. Empirically, Kahn and Sherer (1990)
present evidence that senior managers receive stronger incentives than junior ones, but we
are unaware of any studies on similar diﬀerences in the intensity of monitoring. Clearly,
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and others are of the general view that internal monitoring
mechanisms for CEOs are very weak.
9 A plot of (34) when ¯ A = 10 and 3 ≤ p ≤ 19 shows that the unconstrained maximizers of (33)
solve the problem in (34). We therefore used the FindRoot routine in Mathematica 5 to numerically
solve the unconstrained ﬁrst-order conditions for (33), and then checked that those solutions satisﬁed the
unconstrained second-order conditions and the constraint βV > 1. Finally, we veriﬁed that our solutions
were more proﬁtable than β = p − 1 and V = 1/(p − 1), the relevant solutions when βV ≤ 1.
196. Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a version of the standard linear principal-agent model where
the agent experiences anxiety, rather than the usual economic aversion to risk. We derived
the basic framework from the psychological expected utility theory of Caplin and Leahy
(2001), and used the processing eﬃciency theory of Eysenck and Calvo (1992) and the
experimentation model in Rauh and Seccia (2006) to motivate more speciﬁc comparative
statics assumptions. In particular, a distinctive feature of the anxiety construct, which is
supported by the empirical psychology literature, is that anxiety can be motivational or
demotivational, so incentives can have hidden rewards or hidden costs, respectively. In
contrast, the direct incentive eﬀect of contingent rewards can only be accentuated when
the agent’s subjective evaluation of uncertainty is expressed as a risk premium, under the
standard assumption that the CARA is decreasing in expected income. If incentives can
have hidden costs, this may help explain why extensive high-powered incentive systems
are relatively rare, as well as empirical ﬁndings such as Jensen and Murphy (1990). In
comparison with B´ enabou and Tirole (2003), in our theory mid-level incentives can actually
be counterproductive, although an optimizing principal never oﬀers them in equilibrium.
Likewise, monitoring reduces anxiety by lowering the variance of the productivity
shock, and can therefore be motivational or demotivational. Unlike incentives, monitoring
can be demotivational in equilibrium, as in Frey (1993) and Barkema (1995), who found
that monitoring is demotivational when the principal-agent relationship is close. Their
ﬁndings are also consistent with our theory, since close principal-agent relationships should
entail low monitoring costs. Since anxiety can be motivational, the principal may choose
incomplete monitoring even when monitoring is costless, and may introduce extraneous
noise for motivational purposes. The fact that monitoring can be directly motivational in
our theory suggests that incentives and monitoring may be substitutes or complements,
which we conﬁrmed via simulations. The simulations also revealed that optimal eﬀort and
expected performance may conform to the inverted-U hypothesis, which is supported by
many studies in the empirical psychology literature.
A major contribution of conventional principal-agent theory has been the identiﬁcation
20of a fundamental trade-oﬀ between incentives and optimal risk-sharing. The present paper
has shown the continuing relevance of that contribution, even when explaining seemingly
contrary experimental and econometric evidence on the demotivational eﬀects of incentives
and monitoring, provided that anxiety is used to represent the subjective evaluation of
uncertainty, rather than the usual risk premium concept. In particular, one need not invoke
aspects of intrinsic motivation such as trust, altruism, or sociological norms. On the other
hand, we acknowledge the importance of intrinsic motivation for real-world contracting,
and in our view the present paper should be considered as complementing that emerging
literature.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
At an interior solution,
Πβ = (p − C0 − Ae)eβ − 2βVAV = 0 (A1)
ΠV = (p − C0 − Ae)eV − M0 − β2AV = 0. (A2)
Substituting (9) and (10) and rearranging,
p − C0 − Ae =
(2βVAV )(C00 + Aee)
1 − 2βVAeV
(A3)
p − C0 − Ae =
(−M0 − β2AV )(C00 + Aee)
β2AeV
. (A4)
From the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition, β = C0 + Ae. Substituting this into (A3) and
rearranging gives (14). Equating (A3) and (A4) gives (15). Since 1 − 2βVAeV > 0,
eβ > 0. Since p − C0 − Ae > 0, the sign of eV is governed by (A2).
21Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is a standard Kuhn-Tucker argument. Since A(e,0) is constant for all e > 0,
Ae(e,0) = Aee(e,0) = 0 for all e > 0. From the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition, e = ˆ e(β).
The necessary condition for V = 0 is
(p − β)eV − β2AV ≤ 0 (A5)




≤ β2AV . (A6)
Since e = ˆ e(β) > 0, AeV (ˆ e(β),0) < 0, and Aee(ˆ e(β),0) = 0, this reduces to
(p − β)|AeV (ˆ e(β),0)|
C00(ˆ e(β))
≤ AV (ˆ e(β),0), (A7)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
If x < ¯ x then f0 + xf00 < 0, AeV > 0, and eV < 0. Now, x < ¯ x iﬀ e/β2¯ x < V and
a suﬃcient condition for this is emax/β2¯ x < V. Hence, V +
 (β) ≡ emax/β2¯ x. Similarly,
V −
 (β) ≡ ˆ e(β)/β2¯ x.
Proof of Proposition 5
Fix 0 ≤ e ≤ emax and V > 0. From (10), eβ < 0 iﬀ 2βVAeV > 1. From (20), this reduces




(f0 + xf00). (A8)
Now,
g ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ f0 + xf00 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ x ≤ ¯ x ⇐⇒ β ≥
p
e/¯ xV ≡ βp(e,V). (A9)
At βp(e,V), g switches from negative to positive values, so gβ > 0 at β = βp(e,V). Since
0 ≤ e/β2V ≤ emax/β2V, x → 0 as β → ∞. Since limx→0 f0 + xf00 is ﬁnite, limβ→∞ g = 0





(2x2f000 + 5xf00 + f0). (A10)
Since gβ is continuous as a function of β and gβ = 0 uniquely at ˆ x on (0, ¯ x), the behavior
of g on [βp(e,V),∞) is that it increases to a unique global maximum at β =
p
e/ˆ xV and






(2f00 + xf000). (A11)
Since ˜ x > ¯ x, 2f00 +xf000 > 0 and ge < 0 on [βp(e,V),∞), so increases in e uniformly lower
g as in Figure A below.
Figure A Goes Here
For the rest of the proof, we ﬁx e = emax. At β =
p
emax/ˆ xV, the maximum of g is positive
and equals the expression in (A8). Hence, the maximum of g will be greater than 1 when
¯ A is suﬃciently large, as in Figure A. It follows that there exist 0 < β−(V) < β+(V) < ∞
such that g > 1 on (β−(V),β+(V)). Since eﬀort is bounded above by emax, g > 1 on
(β−(V),β+(V)) for optimal eﬀort as well.
Proof of Proposition 6
Choose V m
 , V M
 such that 0 < V m
 < V ∞
 < V M
 < ∞ and deﬁne Σ = [V m
 ,V M
 ].
Throughout the proof, we consider only V ∈ Σ. Deﬁne x(β,V) =
e(β,V)
β2V , where the
numerator is optimal eﬀort. Since





x(β,V) converges uniformly on Σ to zero as β → ∞. Now consider
1 − 2βVAeV = 1 +
2 ¯ A
βV
[f0(x) + xf00(x)]. (A13)










23the middle term converges uniformly to zero, so the expression in (A13) converges uniformly














































Given assumptions 1(iii), ˆ e(β) → emax as β → ∞. Hence, both the left and right sides of
(A16) are converging to ¯ Aemax|f0(0)| as β → ∞, so the middle term is converging there





It follows that the expression on the right-hand side of (15) is converging uniformly to
(A17) as well. Since (A17) is strictly decreasing, it follows that for large β, any solution
V(β) to (15) will be closely approximated by V ∞
 , and that V(β) → V ∞
 as β → ∞.
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